One of the most striking aspects of Israel’s strike on a Houthi cabinet meeting in Sanaa was the unusually large number of officials gathered at the targeted site. Estimates suggest that more than 30 individuals were present, including no fewer than 18 ministers out of 22, along with aides, chiefs of staff, deputies, and senior supervisors affiliated with the Houthi movement. Among them was the Defense Ministry’s overseer, Asaad al-Hadi, known as “Abu Sakhr,” a key military figure according to multiple sources.

 

It remains unclear whether this was a routine government meeting venue or a private council, particularly as government meetings in Yemen rarely take place after 5 p.m.

 

The simultaneous presence of so many first- and second-tier officials points to a serious security breach. Yet this factor may be less significant given that Houthi ministers—unrecognized internationally—are easily accessible to the public and reachable via mobile phones, which may have enabled Israel to pinpoint both the time and location of the gathering.

 

Preliminary assessments, based on condolence statements and field monitoring, indicate that at least 90 percent of those in attendance were killed in the Israeli strike. Nevertheless, the Houthis did not announce any survivors, only reporting cases of individuals in critical condition

Details remain scarce, with only the name of Prime Minister Ahmed Ghaleb al-Rahwi mentioned publicly. The omission of other names suggests that key figures may have been killed, though the Houthis prefer not to disclose them.

 

Notably, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi is known to occasionally join cabinet sessions via closed-circuit television and has demonstrated a close interest in their details. According to reliable accounts, he has used this method in past meetings with the UN envoy and other figures—raising the stakes of the strike’s implications.

 

The impact of the attack can be read on several levels:

 

• Militarily: Field capabilities may remain largely intact since no frontline commanders or strategic figures appear to have been killed. Still, even a temporary disruption of communication between political and military leadership could complicate operational decisions and delay battlefield coordination.

 

• Domestically, in terms of security: The group will be compelled to launch internal investigations and manhunts for the source of the leak or breach. This is likely to breed suspicion and mistrust within its security apparatus and could ignite tensions among rival factions.
• In terms of public image: Large-scale gatherings may give way to smaller, more secretive meetings—undermining the image of “state authority and control” the group has sought to project to its base.

 

The security failure that enabled the strike appears rooted in several factors:

 

1. A glaring weakness in protecting government meetings, which the Houthis often held at predictable times and locations—making them easy to track.

 

2. A strong likelihood of Israeli intelligence penetration via monitoring of communication devices.

 

 

3. Misreading the scope of Israel’s targeting policy, as recent strikes had largely focused on infrastructure, leading the Houthis to believe their leadership was not a priority target.

 

4. The Houthis had relied on the dense population around sites such as Faj Attan, the Presidential Palace district, Beit Bous, and Hadda. But this assumption proved wrong, as it did not stop Israel from going ahead with the strike

 

 

These conditions echo previous Israeli assassinations of Hezbollah commanders in Lebanon and Iranian leaders during the ongoing covert conflict between Israel and Iran, as well as in Syria and Iraq—where intelligence penetration proved decisive.

 

The key question now: Was this merely a symbolic blow, or a qualitative military success?

 

If the casualties were limited to civilian officials, the attack was largely symbolic, striking at the Houthis’ image rather than their military core. In that case, Israel achieved a significant morale victory, but one with limited impact on battlefield strength.

 

Still, the Houthis will be forced to revise their security doctrine:

 

• Break up large meetings and scatter them across different times and locations.

 

• Ban electronic devices and phones from meeting halls.

 

 

• Extend security procedures for convoys and movements.

 

• Increase internal surveillance at the expense of administrative flexibility.

 

 

While these steps may offer partial protection, they will also slow coordination and hamper daily governance. Should Israel strike again within weeks, it would signal that it holds a dynamic target bank inside Sanaa, and that Houthi concealment remains fragile.

 

In that scenario, the group would face the prospect of a comprehensive restructuring of its decision-making processes, delaying responses in the field and creating new vulnerabilities in internal management. If the strike proves to be an isolated event, however, it will stand as a major symbolic victory for Israel, but one with limited direct operational effect.

 

*Ahmed Al-Shalfi is the Yemeni affairs editor at Al Jazeera.